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NEGLIGENCE-CAUSATION-LlABILITY UNDER STATUTE FOR INJURY RESULTING FROM Fnm STARTED BY RA:rr.RoAD LocoMoTIVE-Sparks from defendant's train started a fue on defendant's right of way which spread toward
plaintiff's farm. Plaintiff, in an attempt to contain the .fire, plowed a .fire
guard along the edge of his property. While driving his tractor to a safe
place after completing the last furrow, he ran over a root or limb which flew
up and struck him in the eye, causing blindness. In the trial court plaintiff
recovered from the railroad under an Oklahoma statute which specified that
"Any railroad company operating any line in this state shall be liable for all
damages sustained by fue originating from operating its road.'11 On appeal,
held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. The .fire was the proximate cause of
the injury. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Ginn, (Okla. 1953) 264 P. (2d)
351.
Many jurisdictions, not being satisfied with the common law requirement
that railroads use ordinary care to prevent .6res,2 have enacted statutes which
do not require proof of negligence, but impose liability upon the railroad upon
a showing that plaintiff suffered damages resulting from a fue which either
originated on a railroad right of way or was caused by railroad operations.3
Statutes imposing this strict liability have uniformly been held constitutional.t
Some of these statutes cover property damages only.5 Others make the railroad liable for all damages arising from fires which it causes.6 Courts usually
adhere to the idea that contributory negligence is not a defense to liability
under these statutes7 unless it is gross negligence. 8 Most courts, as evidenced
by the principal case, apply the doctrine of proximate cause to determine the
railroad's liability under these statutes, but there is authority to the effect that
l Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 2, §748.
2 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Howe,

(Ky. 1952) 243 S.W. (2d) 905; Pollard v. Walton,
55 Ga. App. 353, 190 S.E. 396 (1937).
3 Under the statute in the principal case, plaintiff need not prove negligence. Midland
Valley R. Co. v. Barton, 191 Okla. 359, 129 P. (2d) 1007 (1942); Schaff v. Coyle, 121
Okla. 228, 249 P. 947 (1926). For a similar view in other states, see Nelson v. Chicago,
B. & 0. R. Co., 47 S.D. 228, 197 N.W. 288 (1924); Jasper v. Wabash R. Co., (Mo. App.
1929) 24
(2d) 243.
4 Grissell v. Housatonic R. Co., 54 Conn. 447, 9 A. 137 (1886); Dickelman Mfg. Co.
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (D.C. Ohio 1929) 34 F. (2d) 70.
5 An example is the Missouri statute: ''Each railroad corporation owning or operating
a railroad in this state shall be responsible in damages to every person and corporation
whose property may be injured or destroyed by fire communicated directly or indirectly by
locomotive engines in use upon the railroad owned or operated by such railroad corporation.•••" 37 Mo. Stat. Ann. (1953) §537.380.
6 An example is the Ohio statute: "Every company, or the receiver of such company,
operating a railroad or a part of a railroad, is liable for all loss or damage by fues originating
upon the land belonging to such company caused by operating such railroad." Ohio Rev.
Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4963.37.
7 Fraser-Patterson Lumber Co. v. Southern R. Co., (D.C. S.C. 1948) 79 F. Supp.
424; Kansas Oity S.R. Co. v. Harris, 105 Ark. 374, 151 S.W. 992 (1912).
s Union Seed Co. v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 121 Ark. 585, 181 S.W. 898
(1916). For cases where statutes have created an express exception when the owner is
guilty of contributory negligence, see Hubbard v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 72 Conn.
24, 43 A. 550 (1899); Martin v. New York & N.E.R. Co., 62 Conn. 331, 25 A. 239 (1892).
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liability attaches irrespective of a determination of proximate cause.9 There
is a distinct split among the courts on whether recovery can be made by one
who is burned or injured by over-exertion in fighting a fire which threatened
his home. The weight of authority seems to be with those courts that apply
the usual proximate cause equation, saying that since the intervening act of
the plaintiff in fighting the fire is foreseeable and probable, the causal chain
is not broken and plaintiff may recover.10 This doctrine has been extended
to encompass a case where plaintiff was trying to protect the property of another.11 The minority view, based on the often-criticized case of Seale v. Gulf,
C. & S. F. R. Co.,12 is that the attempt to put out the fire is in itself the
proximate cause of any injury plaintiff may receive while engaged in the
attempt, even though he may have acted in a reasonable manner.13 Some
majority view cases have strained the causal chain close to the breaking point.14
The principal case is one of them. Here, while the injury undoubtedly
happened because of the fire, it was of a type which might well have occurred
while the plaintiff was plowing his farm on any other day. Thus, to allow
recovery might seem to create liability because of a fortuitous coincidence.
The customary rules of proximate cause logically dictate recovery by the plaintiff because the actions of plaintiff in protecting his home certainly are to
be expected and the injury did result from the expectable acts. Of course,
if one requires that the injury itself be expectable, the defendant must prevail. -It is this latter view that is offered by the dissenting judges in the
principal case as one reason for not allowing recovery, 15 and the same theory
9 Thompson v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 24 S.C. 366 (1885); Fraser-Patterson Lumber
Co. v. Southern R. Co., note 7 supra.
10 Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 30 N.D. 456, 153 N.W. 429 (1915); Glanz v.
Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 119 Iowa 611, 93 N.W. 575 (1903). A leading case supporting this view contains the following language: "Appellant was bound to anticipate,
when the fire started, that decedent would try to put it out. . . • if in so doing the fire
which appellant had negligently set out spread to and ignited clothing without any want
on her part of the care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the
circumstances, the appellant should be held to have anticipated such result probable, and
to be liable therefore." Illinois Central R. Co. v. Siler, 229 ill. 390 at 394, 82 N.E. 362
(1907).
11 Liming v. Illinois Central R. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N.W. 66 (1890).
12 65 Tex. 274 (1886). For a criticism of the Seale case, see 4 SHEARMAN AND REDPIBLD, NEGLIGENCE, rev, ed., 1734 (1941).
1s Pike v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (C.C. N.H. 1889) 39 F. 255; Braden v. St. LouisSan Francisco R. Co., 223 Ala. 659, 137 S. 663 (1931); Allison v. St. Louis Southwestern
R. Co., (Tex. 1924) 257 S.W. 959.
14 Other examples are Serafian v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co., (Tex. 1897) 42 S.W.
142 (railroad not liable for injury caused by sleeping on neighbor's cold floor after house
burned down); Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Hinton, 141 Ala. 606, 37 S. 635
(1904) (railroad liable where child crawled back into burning house after being safely
removed and left on veranda); Braden v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., note 13 supra
(railroad not liable for injury caused by plaintiff's falling off a ladder while preparing to
fight fire on roof).
·
15 "However, it cannot be said with equal logic that one guilty of negligence is
required to anticipate that injury may occur from some unknown and unidentified force not
actively concerned with or identified as being a part of the result of defendant's negligence."
Principal case at 355.
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is often the basis for decisions supporting the minority view.16 The minority
in the principal case also admits that the law as stated by the majority is
correct, but concludes, that this is not the place to apply it. 17 It appears that
the dissenting judges have chosen this way to express their dissatisfaction with
the far-reaching result that the principles of causation command. Nevertheless, in view of the absolute character of the statute involved, and the duty
imposed on the farmer to mitigate damages by thwarting the fire, 18 the result of the principal case is perfectly consonant with good reason.
Howard. N. Thiele, Jr., S.Ed.

16 Allison

v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., note 15 supra; Seale v. Gulf, C. & S.F.R.

Co., note 13 supra.

17 Principal case at 354.
18 Glanz v. Chicago, M.

& St. P.R. Co., note 10 supra; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Fry,
157 Tenn. 376, 8 S.W. (2d) 363 (1928).

